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At the descriptive level, certainly, you would expect different cultures to develop 
different sorts of ethics and obviously they have; that doesn’t mean that you can’t think 
of overarching ethical principles you would want people to follow in all kinds of places. 
 
-Peter Singer 
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ABSTRACT 
Previous research has started to map the moral domain for individual actors. In particular, 
Haidt and colleagues (Haidt, 2007, 2008; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) 
have extended the moral domain beyond the traditional notions of justice and rights 
concerns. From this line of research, moral foundations theory emerged, which holds 
moral intuitions derive from innate psychological mechanisms that co-evolved with 
cultural institutions and practices. However, to date, there has not been a systematic 
demonstration of how these moral foundations operate within intergroup settings. Janoff-
Bulman and Carnes (2013) have proposed a comprehensive model of the moral landscape 
that includes a group component; however, this model has received some criticism (e.g., 
Graham, 2013). The current study examined how moral foundations operate from a group 
perspective. Moreover, potential outgroup moderators of moral foundations were 
examined. Participants were placed into one of two conditions in which they rated the 
extent to which various concerns were relevant when making moral judgments about 
their ingroup and various outgroups. Two sets of three different outgroups conforming to 
the various quadrants of the stereotype content model were used. Results showed 
significant differences for the harm, fairness, and loyalty foundations between ingroups 
and outgroups. Moreover, the type of outgroup significantly influenced moral 
foundations scores. Taken together, these findings demonstrate the importance of 
considering moral foundations at the group level. 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Recently, researchers have begun mapping the moral domain that individuals use 
to make moral judgments. In particular, work by Haidt and colleagues (Haidt, 2007, 
2008; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) has expanded notions of the moral 
domain beyond the justice and rights concerns of individuals traditionally associated with 
moral psychology. Indeed, an oft-cited definition of morality comes from Turiel (1983, 
p.3), who defined the moral domain as “prescriptive judgments of justice, right, and 
welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other.” Since there are many 
individuals (e.g., conservatives, people of non-Western cultures) who fall outside of this 
moral domain, Hadit (2008) put forth an alternative approach to defining morality that 
does not exclude moral concerns that involve no harm to people (e.g., obedience, prayer, 
purity).  
In this new approach, Haidt specified the functions of moral systems rather than 
the content of a particular moral judgment: “Moral systems are interlocking sets of 
values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together 
to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible” (p. 70, 2008). Haidt 
further described two common kinds of moral systems (i.e., two ways of suppressing 
selfishness). Some cultures attempt to suppress selfishness by protecting individuals 
directly and by teaching individuals to respect the rights of other individuals. This  
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individualizing approach focuses on individuals as the locus of moral value. Other 
cultures attempt to suppress selfishness by strengthening groups and institutions and by 
binding individuals to roles and duties in order to constrain their imperfect natures. This 
binding approach focuses on the group as the locus of moral value.  
Moral foundations theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) holds 
moral intuitions derive from innate psychological mechanisms that co-evolved with 
cultural institutions and practices. These innate but modifiable mechanisms provide 
socializing agents (e.g., parents) the moral foundations to build on as they teach children 
their local virtues, vices, and moral practices.  
To derive the moral foundations proposed in moral foundations theory, Haidt and 
Joseph (2004) surveyed lists of virtues from various cultures and eras, along with 
taxonomies of morality from anthropology, psychology, and evolutionary theories about 
human and primate sociality. They looked for cases of virtues or other moral concerns 
found widely across cultures for which there were plausible and published evolutionary 
explanations of related psychological mechanisms. They found human obsession with 
fairness, reciprocity, and justice fit well with writings about reciprocal altruism, and the 
human concern with caring, nurturing, and protecting vulnerable individuals fit well with 
empathy. Respectively, these were labeled the fairness/reciprocity foundation and the 
harm/care foundation. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) refer to these two foundations as 
the individualizing foundations because they are the source of intuitions that emphasize 
the rights and welfare of individuals.  
However, as mentioned, many people do not limit their virtues to those that 
protect individuals. Haidt and Joseph (2004) found virtues of loyalty, patriotism, and self-
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sacrifice aligned with work on the evolution of coalitional psychology. Virtues of 
subordinates combined with virtues of authorities matched writings on the evolution of 
hierarchy in primates and research on ethic of community. Lastly, virtues of purity and 
sanctity that play large roles in religious laws aligned with writings on the evolution of 
disgust and contamination sensitivity. Graham and colleagues (2009) refer to these three 
foundations (i.e., loyalty, authority, and purity) as the binding foundations because they 
are the source of intuitions that emphasize group-binding loyalty, duty, and self-control. 
Moral foundations theory has received a fair amount of attention in the research 
literature. Haidt and colleagues have mostly focused on examining moral foundations 
among political ideology groups (e.g., Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). 
However, because they use self-identified political groups, the results tend to be 
correlational in nature. As of yet, there has not been a systematic demonstration of how 
these moral foundations operate within intragroup and intergroup settings. Systematically 
investigating moral foundations within group settings is an important notion to 
incorporate into a model of morality because group membership can influence an 
individual’s behavior and judgment. For example, groups tend to behave in 
uncooperative ways in order to protect or enhance the group compared to individuals who 
tend to choose to cooperate in the same situation (Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & 
Schopler, 2003). This effect has been termed the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity 
effect. Essentially, the finding demonstrates a discontinuity between inter-individual and 
inter-group interactions in mixed motive situations (i.e., situations in which individuals or 
groups have both common and competing goals). For example, during a prisoner’s 
dilemma game, two individuals will typically agree to cooperate and follow through 
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when making their individual choices. However, when two groups play the same game, 
they tend to agree to cooperate during communication, but in most cases, they choose to 
defect when making their actual choices. Thus, instead of exaggerating the individual’s 
dominant strategy of cooperation, groups tend to have a dominant strategy of competition 
(see Wildschut et al., 2003).  
This finding is likely a function of evolutionary adaptations related to the 
propensity for humans to live within group contexts (Brewer & Caporael, 2006). Because 
survival depended on individuals banding together in groups for strength and safety, 
individuals that could come together in order to successfully enhance and protect each 
other were more likely to survive. These tendencies are still present and are beneficial in 
many contexts. For example, there are groups that work to assist children in need in areas 
where there is not enough money for proper nutrition, medicine, or other basic needs 
(e.g., Save the Children). Such groups aim to provide children with a healthy start and to 
protect them from harm in order to help change the children’s future as well as society’s. 
On the other hand, there are other situations in which what is good for the group is not 
good for those outside of the group. For instance, joining a gang that is involved in 
criminal activity may provide one with a sense of belonging and even be somewhat 
financially prosperous for those lacking legitimate means to do so, but the criminal 
activities (e.g., graffiti, theft, violence) are often a significant financial, physical, and 
psychological drain on the surrounding communities. Furthermore, social identity theory 
states group identification directly leads to ingroup favoritism as well as other behaviors 
that differentiate one’s group from others (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Work on the role of 
groups in evolutionary adaptation of the species argues that living and hunting in groups 
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had survival implications and being rejected by the group could lead to starvation and 
death (Levine & Kerr, 2007). Thus, the tendency for a group to enhance and protect itself 
is likely present and deeply embedded in most group settings. Once group members begin 
to think of themselves as a group, they will begin to favor options that protect or enhance 
the group welfare (Tindale, Talbot, & Martinez, 2013).   
However, protecting the group from harm can only be possible if the group can 
readily identify what it needs to be protected from. Not only does the group need to be 
able to identify a threat, they must also be able to do this quickly. Thus, categorization of 
social units (i.e., stereotypes) serves a very important function for groups. Specifically, 
perceivers must use a limited cognitive processing system to cope with the rich and 
complex social stimulus environment they live in and they need to understand as well as 
anticipate interactions within that environment (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). Due to the 
limitations of the human cognition system, grouping objects and people into categories 
on the basis of their similarities or differences becomes functionally adaptive.  
Additionally, a fundamental basis for social categorization is the distinction 
between a group to which one belongs (i.e., ingroup) and to those that one does not 
belong (i.e., outgroup). For example, Tajfel established what is known as the “minimal 
group paradigm” (see Diehl, 1990) to study the influence of social categorization 
processes independent of intergroup conflict. In the paradigm, participants are first asked 
to make individual judgments about certain stimuli (e.g., evaluate paintings, estimate the 
number of dots on a display) and are then given feedback that identifies them as similar 
to some of the other participants and as different from the remaining participants (e.g., 
similar preference of paintings or over estimating the number of dots). In actuality, 
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participants are randomly assigned to one of the two groups without knowing what 
group the other participants are assigned to. Participants are then asked to rate members 
of their own and the other group or are asked to allocate resources to these respective 
groups. Based on various studies using this paradigm, the primary finding is that 
participants favorably evaluate and allocate more resources to members of their own 
group, even though they do not know the specific identities of those in their group (i.e., 
ingroup bias). Thus, the mere perception of belonging to different groups triggers ingroup 
favoritism and relative outgroup discrimination. This corroborates Allport’s (1954) 
argument that one of the most basic categorization processes consists of people 
categorizing each other into ingroups and outgroups. Because of this categorization 
process, information is tagged by physical and social distinctions (e.g., race and gender), 
within-group differences are minimized, between-group differences are exaggerated, and 
group members’ behaviors are interpreted stereotypically (Taylor, 1981; Wilder, 1981). 
However, not all stereotypes are alike. For instance, some stereotyped groups are 
deemed inept (e.g., elderly people) whereas others are revered are their intellect (e.g., 
Asians). Hence, the stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) argues 
two dimensions can capture the content of stereotypes: warmth and competence. These 
particular dimensions result from interpersonal and intergroup interactions. When 
meeting others as individuals or group members, people typically want to know what the 
others’ goals will be in relation to the self or ingroup and how effectively the others will 
pursue their goals. That is, perceivers want to know the others’ intent and capability. 
Respectively, these characteristics correspond to perceptions of warmth and competence 
(Fiske et al., 2002). 
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Stereotype content tends to result from shared public views of groups. Fiske and 
colleagues (2002) argue that such cultural stereotypes result from social structural 
relations in two primary ways. First, outgroups are perceived as more competent to the 
extent they are seen as powerful and high in status or are perceived as less competent to 
the extent they are seen as less powerful and low in status. The link between a group’s 
societal outcomes and its perceived competence may represent a form of correspondence 
bias (i.e., peoples’ behavior reflects their traits) or reflect just-world thinking (i.e., people 
get what they deserve). At the group level, it justifies the system and legitimizes power-
prestige rankings. Fiske and colleagues (2002) also argue intergroup stereotypes function 
to justify the status quo. The second way cultural stereotypes result from social structural 
relations is outgroups are seen as relatively warm and nice to the extent they do not 
compete with others. Competitive outgroups, in contrast, tend to frustrate and annoy. 
Thus, they are viewed as having negative intent. Outgroup goals are assumed to interfere 
with ingroup goals, so outgroups are not warm. This incompatibility of intergroup goals 
is a primary source of negative affect toward outgroups (Fiske et al., 2002). Outgroups 
that are low in both warmth and competence also compete with other groups, primarily 
for resources instead of status. These groups are often viewed as parasites in the system 
and supposedly compete in a zero-sum game of resource allocation. Since their goals are 
also incompatible with others (i.e., competitive) they are not considered to be warm. This 
is in stark contrast to the ingroup. Since the ingroup does not compete with itself, it is 
perceived as warm. Hence, the cultural default group (e.g., middle class, heterosexual, 
Christian) is not often seen as competitive because they possess cultural authority (Fiske 
et al., 2002).  
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Returning to the topic of morality, Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013) have 
proposed an extended model of the moral landscape that includes a group component; 
however, this model has received some criticism (e.g., Graham, 2013). The Model of 
Moral Motives (MMM) proposed by Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013) includes an 
approach-avoidance component as well. One can visualize the MMM by thinking of a 2 x 
3 matrix, in which the rows are divided by motives to protect (i.e., avoidance) and 
motives to provide (i.e., approach). Each of the columns of the matrix represents a 
different focus of moral concern: the self, others, and the group. However, as Graham 
(2013) notes, the model contains some ambiguity about how these distinctions are made. 
For example, it is unclear whether these distinctions are the targets of moral judgment or 
if they represent the locus of moral concern. The former involves the person or thing that 
did some moral action whereas the latter involves the thing one is motivated to protect or 
provide for. Additionally, the model falls short by excluding the intergroup context. In 
the MMM, intergroup conditions are assumed to be a consequence of intragroup 
conditions. However, this is not necessarily always true, just as interpersonal conditions 
are not simply a consequence of intrapersonal conditions. Moreover, the model posits that 
all of the moral foundations, save the harm foundation, are exclusively proscriptive 
(avoid) or prescriptive (approach). However, past research has shown the types of moral 
concerns covered by the foundations involve both motivations to inhibit the bad and 
activate the good (see Graham, 2013). 
Following in the fashion of those who have proposed the MMM, the current study 
seeks to examine how moral foundations operate from a group perspective. However, 
given the approach/avoidance motivation component as well as the criticisms the model 
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has received, this study begins at a more fundamental level and focuses purely on the 
moral foundations component. Given the propensity for groups to protect themselves and 
enhance their own welfare, it is likely that they will be sensitive to threats from outgroups 
and thus focus on fairness, reciprocity, and justice. This sensitivity to outgroup threat 
means groups would be sensitive to concerns relating to the individualizing foundations 
of harm and fairness (i.e., hypothesis 1). However, when judging the ingroup, virtues of 
loyalty, patriotism, and self-sacrifice for the group should surface. These virtues would 
have made it possible for groups to initially band together for strength and safety. Thus, 
when judging their ingroup (as opposed to outgroups), individuals will be more likely to 
utilize the binding foundations (i.e., loyalty, authority, and purity), as these foundations 
emphasize group-binding loyalty, duty, and self-control (i.e., hypothesis 2). 
However, the stereotype content model argues that different outgroups can 
promote different reactions and expectations. Thus, differing types of outgroups may 
moderate the moral foundations that are utilized by group members (i.e., hypothesis 3). 
For example, outgroups that are low in warmth and high in competence tend to be viewed 
as competitive and invoke negative intent. In this case, such outgroups are expected to be 
harmful and unfair; thus, concerns about the harm and fairness foundations may not be as 
relevant because this outgroup is not violating expectations of harm and fairness (i.e., 
hypothesis 3a). Using a similar rationale, an outgroup that is viewed as low in warmth 
and low in competence might invoke disgust. Since this particular outgroup is expected to 
be disgusting, concerns about the purity foundation may not be as relevant because the 
outgroup is not violating any expectations of purity (i.e., hypothesis 3b). While it is still 
unclear how exactly differing outgroups may moderate the group’s utilization of moral 
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foundations, it appears it is a likely possibility that they do. Thus, six prototypic target 
outgroups were chosen based on past research of the stereotype content model for 
participants to judge (i.e., two low warmth, high competent outgroups; two low warmth, 
low competent outgroups; and two high warmth, low competent outgroups). Moral 
judgments of these three outgroup types will be compared to moral judgments of ingroup 
members, assuming ingroup members will be seen as high in both warm and competence. 
Thus, in the present research, participants made judgments of moral concerns for four 
different groups: a high warmth, high competent (HwHc) ingroup; a low warmth, high 
competent (LwHc) outgroup (i.e., the rich or business professionals); a high warmth, low 
competent (HwLc) outgroup (i.e., the elderly or housewives); and a low warmth, low 
competent (LwLc) outgroup (i.e., the homeless or welfare recipients) based on a modified 
version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
Preliminary analysis 
Power analyses were conducted using G*Power, a general power analysis 
program. Power analyses were conducted for both an independent means t-test and one-
way repeated measures, within factors MANCOVA with medium effect sizes and 
standard power of .80. With these requirements, a sample size of at least 128 participants 
was needed to provide adequate power for detecting effects for the independent means t-
test and a sample size of at least 76 participants (38 participants per condition) was 
needed to provide adequate power for detecting effects for the one-way repeated 
measures, within factors MANCOVA. Thus, it was determined that approximately 64 
participants were needed per condition, yielding a total sample of 128 for this study. 
Since initial pilot tests revealed approximately 30% if the data could not be used due to 
some participants potentially belonging to a group that was designed to be an outgroup, 
77 additional participants were needed to ensure an adequate sample. This number was 
derived by rounding up the average percent of data lost in the two within participant 
conditions of the pilot study (i.e., 54%) to 60% and multiplying it by the sample of 128.  
Pilot study 
Prior to this experiment, a pilot study was conducted to insure the ratings across 
the two instances of each outgroup (e.g., the rich and business professionals are both  
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LwHc outgroups) did not substantially differ. The pilot test design used a total sample 
of 148 participants and was comprised of nine conditions. Two of the nine conditions 
included within-subject designs that asked participants to rate one ingroup and three 
outgroups. The other seven conditions consisted of between-subject designs that asked 
participants to rate just one group (i.e., one ingroup condition and six outgroup 
conditions).  
Results of the pilot test indicated groups tended to not be significantly different 
between the within-participant conditions and between-participant conditions. 
Specifically, a series of t-tests were conducted between each within-participant condition 
and the corresponding between-participant condition on the five moral foundations (e.g., 
within-participant “the rich” target outgroup and between-participant “the rich” target 
outgroup). All results were not significant except three outcomes (see appendix A). These 
were the harm foundation for one of the within-participant intragroup manipulations, 
t(33) = -2.32, p < .05, the harm foundation for the rich, t(22) = -2.90, p < .01, and the 
loyalty foundation for the rich, t(22) = -2.16, p < .05. However, these significant results 
yielded small effects. In the intragroup manipulations, participants in the within-
participant condition scored lower on the harm foundation (M = 3.09, SD = .90) than 
those in the between-participant condition (M = 3.67, SD = .57). In the rich 
manipulations, participants in the within-participant condition scored lower on the harm 
foundation (M = 2.56, SD = .76) and lower on the loyalty foundation (M = 2.42, SD = 
.50) than those in the between-participant condition (M = 3.49, SD = .77 and M = 2.95, 
SD = .66, respectively). Therefore, the pilot study demonstrated a within-participant 
design could be utilized. 
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Participants 
Four hundred five undergraduates at Loyola University Chicago voluntarily 
participated for course credit in their introductory psychology class. Participants were at 
least 18 years of age and were recruited from the Loyola University Chicago psychology 
participant pool. The total sample size was 410 participants, and the mean age of the 
participants was 18.93 years (SD = 1.13). However, 24 participants did not include their 
age. Participant ethnicity was as follows: 217 Caucasian, 73 Asian, 61 Hispanic, 15 
Black, 11 Middle Eastern, and 33 either gave an invalid response or did not respond at 
all. Participant sex consisted of 299 females and 88 males, while 23 either gave an invalid 
respond or did not respond at all.  
Key variables 
 This study contained two notable independent variables: outgroup sets and type of 
group. Specifically, the target outgroup set participants were asked to judge was varied in 
two conditions. An outgroup set was comprised of an ingroup target and three outgroup 
targets based on the stereotype content model. At one level of the outgroup set, 
participants rated an ingroup target (i.e., group the participant most identified with) and 
three outgroup targets (i.e., the rich, housewives, and the homeless). At the second level 
of the outgroup set, participants rated an ingroup target (i.e., a group the participant most 
identified with) and three different outgroup targets (i.e., business professionals, the 
elderly, and welfare recipients). Thus, in both levels, participants rated four different 
groups. This manipulation was done to generalize beyond one group particular for each 
social category of the stereotype content model. 
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The second independent variable (i.e., type of group) included four levels of 
group identification derived from the stereotype content model: (1) a HwHc ingroup, (2) 
a LwHc outgroup, (3) a HwLc outgroup, and (4) a LwLc outgroup. These four levels of 
group type were then crossed with the two levels of the outgroup set. Thus, participants 
rated one HwHc ingroup (i.e., a group the participant most identified with), one LwHc 
outgroup (i.e., either the rich or business professionals), one HwLc outgroup (i.e., either 
housewives or the elderly), and one LwLc outgroup (i.e., either the homeless or welfare 
recipients).  
These particular outgroup exemplars were chosen based on past research 
conducted on the stereotype content model. Specifically, these outgroups have been the 
most frequently used across a number of studies that have investigated the stereotype 
content model (e.g., Caprariello, Cuddy, & Fiske, 2009; Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske et al., 
2002; Harris & Fiske, 2006; Lee & Fiske, 2006; Rogers, Schroder, & Scholl, 2013). 
Using six distinctly different outgroups that have been shown to vary on in stereotype 
content provides converging evidence of the moral foundations used when judging a 
target outgroup. 
 To measure participants various moral concerns and judgments of these particular 
groups, a modified version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire was used (Graham et 
al., 2009). For this variable, participants filled out a 32-item questionnaire that has been 
validated multiple times in previous research on moral foundations (Graham et al., 2011). 
This measure is comprised of two subscales: 16 moral relevance items and 16 moral 
judgment items. The moral relevance items entail rating various concerns (e.g., whether 
or not someone was harmed) on a 6-point scale anchored by the labels never relevant and 
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always relevant. For each moral foundation there are three items. An additional item 
serves as a check for whether participants paid attention, understood the scale, and 
responded meaningfully. High rating on this item is assumed to indicate careless or 
otherwise not interpretable performance on this subscale and these data were excluded 
from analysis. The moral judgment items add more contextualized, concrete items that 
more strongly trigger the type of moral intuitions that are said to play an important role in 
moral judgment. Similar to the moral relevance items, there are three items per moral 
foundation that are rated on a 6-point scale (from strongly disagree to strongly agree), 
and there is additional item that serves as a check for attention, understandability of the 
scale, and meaningful responses. For each foundation, moral relevance and moral 
judgment items were combined to produce participants’ moral foundation scores (MFS). 
As mentioned, a modified version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire was 
used in the present study. The only modifications made to the questionnaire involved 
minor grammatical changes due to the manipulation of group membership. Specifically, 
in the original questionnaire, moral relevance items asked respondents if an act 
committed by “someone” was relevant or not to their decision of whether something was 
right or wrong. In the present study, these items were prefaced by asking participants to 
think about a particular group (i.e., HwHc, LwHc, HwLc, and LwLc groups). 
Additionally, wherever the original items mentioned “someone”, this was replaced with 
the previously mentioned group or the word “they”. In terms of the moral judgment 
items, in the original questionnaire, respondents were asked to indicate the degree to 
which they agreed or disagreed with various statements. In the modified version, 
participants were asked to complete this same task while keeping in mind the typical 
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member of the same group. Since many of these statements did not suggest a single 
person or persons where involved, pronouns were added so the target of the judgment 
became the group the respondent was thinking about. For example, “Justice is the most 
important requirement for a society” was changed to “Justice for them is the most 
important requirement for a society”. Moreover, in a couple of cases, the original moral 
judgment items contained a reference to the single individual, so these items were also 
modified. For example, “I am proud of my country’s history” was changed to “I believe 
they are proud of their country’s history”. Since participants rated four groups in each 
replication conditions, there were a total of four sets of MFS for each participant. 
Lastly, political orientation was measured and controlled for in the present 
analyses because previous research has shown that MFS are highly correlated with 
political orientation. For example, Graham and colleagues (2009) found that 
conservatives and liberals rely on different sets of moral foundations. Specifically, they 
found that liberals utilize the harm and foundations more than the loyalty, authority, and 
purity foundations; however, conservatives tend to use all five of the foundations more 
equally. Moreover, other research has shown that when disgust is prompted, social 
conservatives tend to be more prejudicial against certain groups. Specifically, Terrizzi, 
Shook, and Ventis (2010) demonstrated that when disgust is experimentally manipulated, 
conservatives showed increased prejudicial attitudes toward contact with homosexuals 
whereas liberals showed reduced prejudice. Based on prior research (e.g., Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Fiske et al., 2002), it was apparent some of the target outgroups used in 
the current study could elicit disgust (e.g., the homeless and welfare recipients). Thus, 
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political orientation was controlled for in order to examine if the effects of group type 
influence participants’ MFS above and beyond political orientation. 
Design 
This study utilized a 2 (outgroup set 1 vs. outgroup set 2) by 4 (type of group: one 
ingroup and three outgroups) design. The type of group is a within-participant factor 
while the outgroup sets were manipulated between participants. In one condition, 
participants rated a group they most identified with, the rich, housewives, and the 
homeless. In the second condition, participants rated a group they most identified with, 
business professionals, the elderly, and welfare recipients. Across conditions, the target 
outgroups were matched on the two dimensions of the stereotype content model (i.e., 
warmth and competence) to control for target outgroup content. Specifically, target 
outgroups perceived as incompetent and cold were the homeless and welfare recipients. 
Target outgroups perceived as incompetent and warm consisted of the elderly and 
housewives. Target outgroups perceived as competent and cold were the rich and 
business professionals. Lastly, target groups perceived as competent and warm were 
considered ingroup members. Thus, the ingroup manipulation serves as both one level of 
the independent variable and the control, thereby increasing statistical power. The 
primary outcome variable was participants’ MFS derived from a modified version of the 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire.  
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two replication conditions (i.e., 
outgroup set 1 or 2). After completing the informed consent form and agreeing to 
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participate, participants were asked to fill out an online survey. This survey was a 
modified version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire  
In each condition, participants filled out the modified Moral Foundations Survey 
four times, each with a different target group. The order the groups were presented was 
based on a Latin square design. Once completing the survey, participants were asked to 
fill out a final questionnaire that included demographic questions and manipulation 
checks imbedded within those questions. 
Lastly, participants filled out a demographics questionnaire that asked for their 
political orientation, age, sex, and ethnicity. Imbedded in this demographic questionnaire 
were questions related to the various group manipulations participants were randomly 
assigned to. These questions included a rating of socioeconomic status and asked if the 
participant or the participant’s family has ever held a profession in business, been 
homeless, received welfare, been a housewife, and been a caretaker for the elderly. If a 
participant was assigned to a particular condition in which they indicated he or she was a 
potential ingroup member of one of these assumed outgroups (e.g., if a person was 
assigned to a business professional manipulation and answered “yes” to the question 
“have you or anyone in your family ever held a profession in the business field”), they 
were excluded from the analyses.  
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
To ensure the accuracy of the group manipulation, a series of manipulation checks 
was embedded in the final questionnaire. Specifically, a conservative one-item measure 
was used to examine the potential possibility that a participant perceived one of the target 
outgroups as an ingroup instead. For example, socioeconomic status was asked to gage if 
participants associated themselves with “The rich” as an ingroup. Other items included 
checks for business professionals (i.e., “Have you or anyone in your family held a 
profession in business?”), the homeless (i.e., “Have you or anyone in your family been 
homeless for an extended period?”), welfare recipients (i.e., “Have you or anyone in your 
family received welfare?”), housewives (i.e., “Have you or anyone in your family held an 
occupation that consisted of caring for one’s family, managing household affairs, and 
doing housework?”), and the elderly (i.e., “Have you or anyone in your family been a 
caretaker for the elderly?”) outgroups. If any participant answered yes to these 
manipulation checks and judged the corresponding outgroup (e.g., answered yes to 
receiving welfare and judged welfare recipients in one of the outgroup sets), then this 
participant’s data was excluded from further analyses.  
After using the exclusionary data procedures, the sample dropped to 121 
participants. Thus, the mean age of the participants used in the final data analysis was 
18.9 years (SD = 1.27). Participant ethnicity for this sample was as follows: 60  
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Caucasian, 25 Asian, 24 Hispanic, five Black, four Middle Eastern, and three either 
gave an invalid response or did not respond at all. Participant gender for this sample 
consisted of 88 females and 31 males, while two participants did not indicate their 
gender. Demographics of this sample did not significantly change from the initial sample 
(see appendix B). 
Hotelling’s T2 was conducted to compare the two outgroup sets on the five MFS 
for each target group (e.g., “the rich” in outgroup set 1 and “business professionals” in 
outgroup set 2). The results showed a significant overall difference between the outgroup 
sets on MFS F(1, 119) = 41.42, p < .05. However, only four comparisons reached 
significance (see appendix C). These four that reached significance were the harm 
foundation for HwHc ingroups, F(1, 119) = 4.85, p < .05, R2Adjusted = .031, the fairness 
foundation for LwHc outgroups, F(1, 119) = 9.31, p < .01, R2Adjusted = .065, the harm 
foundation for HwLc outgroups, F(1, 119) = 6.87, p = .01, R2Adjusted = .047, and the 
fairness foundation for HwLc outgroups, F(1, 119) = 12.27, p = .001, R2Adjusted = .086. 
Specifically, HwHc ingroups scored significantly higher on the harm foundation in the 
second outgroup set compared to the first outgroup set (M = 3.6, SD = .65; M = 3.9, SD = 
.44, respectively), LwHc outgroups scored higher on the fairness foundation in the 
second outgroup set compared to the first outgroup set (M = 3.06, SD = .66; M = 2.55, SD 
= .79, respectively), and HwLc outgroups scored significantly higher on the harm 
foundation in the second outgroup set compared to the first outgroup set (M = 3.84, SD = 
.62; M = 3.43, SD = .74, respectively). HwLc outgroups also scored significantly higher 
on the fairness foundation in the second outgroup set compared to the first outgroup set 
(M = 3.65, SD = .61; M = 3.08, SD = .78, respectively). Since these results produced 
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small effects and the order of means over the outgroup types remained consistent even 
though there were some magnitude differences, reported results were collapsed across 
this variable. For example, participants’ MFS for LwHc outgroups were a composite 
score of those who judged the rich and of those who judged business professionals. 
MFS for target outgroups were averaged into a composite outgroup score, and a 
repeated-measures MANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group identity 
(ingroup vs. outgroup) on MFS while controlling for political orientation. Results showed 
a significant effect of group membership on the harm, F(1, 114) = 12.59, p = .001, ηp2 = 
.1, fairness, F(1, 114) = 14.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .11, and loyalty F(1, 114) = 12.96, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .1, foundations. Specifically, when rating an ingroup, participants scored 
higher on the harm, fairness, and loyalty foundations compared to rating an outgroup (see 
figure 1). When participants rated an ingroup, they scored lower on the authortity 
foundation but higher on the purity foundation compared to when they rated an outgroup 
(see figure 1). However, results for the authority and purity foundations were not 
significant. 
Based on these results, hypothesis 1 was not supported by the data. It was 
predicted participants would score higher on the harm and fairness foundations when 
rating an outgroup compared to an ingroup. However, these data do provide partial 
support to hypothesis 2. It was predicted participants would score higher on the loyalty, 
authority, and purity foundations when rating an ingroup compared to an outgroup. 
Participants did in fact score higher on the loyalty foundation when rating an ingroup; 
however, results for authority and purity foundations did not reach significance. 
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Figure 1. Differences between ingroup and outgroup moral foundation scores 
To further tease apart this relationship and examine if the type of outgroup 
moderated the relationship between group membership and MFS, a second repeated-
measures MANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group on MFS while 
controlling for political orientation. Results showed the type of outgroup, based on the 
stereotype content model, significantly influenced MFS on harm, F(3, 113) = 12.94, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .1, fairness, F(3, 113) = 32.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .22, loyalty, F(3, 113) = 8.49, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .07, and authority, F(3, 113) = 8.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .07, foundations. 
Although there was not a significant effect of group membership on the purity 
foundation, the results were trending towards significance F(3, 113) = 2.53, p = .057, ηp2 
= .02.  
Pairwise comparisons showed that ratings of LwHc outgroups were significantly 
lower on harm and fairness foundations as compared to any other type of group. 
Moreover, ratings of LwHc outgroups showed significantly higher MFS scores for 
2.22.4
2.62.8
33.2
3.43.6
3.8
Harm Fairness Loyalty Authority Purity
Moral foundations 
IngroupOutgroup
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authority and purity foundations, whereas LwLc outgroups exhibited significantly 
lower MFS scores for authority and purity foundations, as compared to other groups. 
Ratings of HwHc ingroups were shown to have the significantly highest MFS for the 
loyalty foundation, whereas ratings of LwLc outgroups exhibited the significantly lowest 
scores for the loyalty foundation. See figure 2 for reported results.  
 
Figure 2. Moral foundation score differences among group type 
 Based on these results, different types of groups did moderate the effect between 
group identity and MFS, providing empirical support for hypothesis 3. For the harm and 
fairness foundations, differences between ingroups and outgroups is mainly a function of 
the LwHc outgroup. However, HwLc and LwLc outgroups were significantly different 
from each other on the fairness foundation as well. For the loyalty foundation, the effect 
seems to be consistent across all groups. Specifically, the HwHc ingroup scored the 
highest on this foundation. For the authority foundation, differences between ingroups 
and outgroups was again mainly a function of the LwHc outgroup, with this group 
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scoring the highest on this foundation. Although the LwHc outgroup did not 
significantly differ from the HwHc ingroup on the authority foundation, the effect was 
approaching significance (p = .054). Lastly, the effect for the purity foundation appears to 
be driven by the LwHc outgroup as well (see figure 2); however, the only significant 
difference on this foundation was between the LwHc and LwLc outgroups. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 The results from the current experiment suggest that how people judge others in 
terms of moral foundations depends on how they categorize them. Whether the target is 
framed as an ingroup or outgroup member influences the perceiver’s utilization of moral 
foundations. However, the moral foundations used when judging these groups do not 
exactly fall in line with the study’s hypotheses. Specifically, given the propensity for 
groups to protect themselves and enhance their own welfare, hypothesis 1 predicted 
participants would be sensitive to threats from outgroups and focus harm and fairness 
foundations when judging outgroup members. However, the results demonstrated that 
participants actually scored significantly lower on these foundations when rating 
outgroup members compared to ingroup members. However, these low scores may still 
align with the notion that ingroups are more sensitive to threats from outgroups. That is, 
if one feels that an outgroup poses a threat, that individual may not consider harm and 
fairness foundations to be particularly relevant to the outgroup’s perspective. Since the 
outgroup can invoke negative intent (e.g., consuming resources, inflicting physical harm, 
etc.), they are judged to be lower on harm and fairness foundations. In other words, 
people may perceive certain outgroups as caring less about fairness and harm because 
they see them as a threat. 
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Moreover, based on the binding foundations derived from moral foundations 
theory, hypothesis 2 predicted when judging the ingroup (as opposed to the outgroup), 
participants would likely focus on the loyalty, authority, and purity foundations. The 
results demonstrated that participants did in fact score significantly higher on the loyalty 
foundation when judging ingroups compared to outgroups, lending partial support to 
hypothesis 2. This makes sense given that loyalty, patriotism, and self-sacrifice to one’s 
ingroup are significant parts of a cohesive social identity and that those who go against 
the ingroup are often treated with distain (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). However, the results 
showed no significant differences between the type of group and the authority and purity 
foundations. On the surface, this appears to be a surprising finding. However, ingroups 
and outgroups are salient entities (e.g., us versus them). In order for these groups to retain 
their entitativity, both groups must show obedience and respect for authority albeit for 
their respective identities. Moreover, these groups have their own leaders and afford their 
own protection. Thus, they are likely to show similar levels of the authority foundation. 
Moreover, practices related to purity serve social functions such as marking off the 
group’s cultural boundaries (Soler, 1973/1979). Given the often salient difference of 
ingroup and outgroup cultures, it seems likely ingroups and outgroups would not 
significantly differ in their MFS on the purity foundation. 
The results of this experiment also have implications for moderators of moral 
foundations at the group level. The stereotype content model suggests that different types 
of outgroups promote different expectations. Thus, hypothesis 3 predicted that differing 
types of outgroups would moderate the moral foundations utilized by participants. The 
results did indeed support this prediction. Specifically, for the harm and fairness 
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foundations, differences between ingroups and outgroups appears to mainly a function 
of the LwHc outgroup. Compared to any other type of group, LwHc groups scored the 
lowest on these foundations. While the LwHc group were seen as less concerned with 
harm and fairness foundations than that of the ingroup, this was not true for other types of 
outgroups. Thus, how the ingroup perceives the outgroup will affect how they rate them 
in terms of moral foundations. 
This finding also supports hypothesis 3a: LwHc outgroups were expected to be 
perceived as harmful and unfair, making concerns about the harm and fairness 
foundations less relevant. This is likely due to the fact that these outgroups tend to be 
viewed as competitive and invoke negative intent from the ingroup’s perspective (Fiske 
et al., 2002). Thus, this type of outgroup is expected to be harmful and unfair, and is not 
seen as violating expectations of harm and fairness. However, HwLc and LwLc 
outgroups were significantly different from each other on the fairness foundation as well, 
such that LwLc outgroups scored lower than HwLc outgroups. This is likely because 
LwLc outgroups are thought to compete with the ingroup as well. However, instead of 
competing for status, they are primarily viewed as competing for resources (Fiske et al., 
2002). In other words, these outgroups are often viewed as parasites in the system and are 
seen as competing in a zero-sum game of resource allocation. 
For the loyalty foundation, the effect seems to be consistent across all groups. 
Specifically, the HwHc ingroup scored the highest on this foundation. Similar to the 
explanation for hypothesis 2, this finding makes sense given that loyalty, patriotism, and 
self-sacrifice to one’s ingroup are significant parts of a cohesive social identity. 
Moreover, if an ingroup does not perceive its group members to be loyal, those who go 
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against the ingroup are often treated with distain. To the extent ingroup members are 
not loyal, they may be ostracized or even exiled from the group in order to protect the 
ingroup’s welfare. Evolutionarily speaking, individuals that could come together in order 
to successfully enhance and protect each other were more likely to survive. Furthermore, 
social identity theory states group identification directly leads to ingroup favoritism as 
well as other behaviors that differentiate one’s group from others (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988). Thus, the tendency for a group to enhance and protect itself, perhaps through 
loyalty, is likely present and deeply embedded in most group settings. 
For the authority foundation, differences between ingroups and outgroups was 
mainly a function of the LwHc outgroup, with this group scoring the highest on this 
foundation. This may be due to the hierarchical structure in many business settings. In 
order for such a hierarchy to effectively function, those working within the structure must 
show obedience and respect for those above them in the hierarchy. It could also be true 
that business professionals and the rich are often thought of as powerful leaders. 
Although the LwHc outgroup did not significantly differ from the HwHc ingroup on the 
authority foundation, the effect was approaching significance (p = .054).  
Lastly, the effect for the purity foundation appears to be driven by the LwHc 
outgroup as well; however, the only significant difference on this foundation was 
between the LwHc and LwLc outgroups, with LwLc outgroups scoring lower than LwHc 
outgroups. Moreover, LwLc outgroups scored the lowest on the foundation compared to 
any other group. This finding supports hypothesis 3b: since LwLc outgroups invoke 
disgust, concerns about the purity foundation would be less relevant compared to any 
other outgroup. In this case, these outgroups may be associated with moral overtones of 
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injustice, indignation, and bitterness toward illegitimate behavior. Given these groups 
are often perceived to detract from others resources (Fiske et al., 2002), they might be 
perceived to have hostile intent that impacts others in society. It might also be the case 
that the particular target groups used in this study (i.e., welfare recipients and the 
homeless) might simply be perceived to be or are associated with being physically 
disgusting to others (e.g., smelly, greasy, dirty, etc.).  
It might be the case that moral foundation use at the group level is driven less by 
moral standards and more by stereotypic expectations. That is, when individuals have 
stereotypic expectations of a particular group, the moral foundations related to those 
specific expectations might not be as relevant. For example, if the ingroup perceives an 
outgroup as potentially causing harm to the ingroup, the ingroup will rate the outgroup 
lower on the moral foundation of harm. However, if a particular group violates its 
stereotypic expectation, the moral foundation associated with that expectation becomes 
more relevant. 
 Taken together, these findings help explain why differing groups disagree on so 
many moral issues and often find it hard to understand how an ethical person could hold 
the beliefs of the other side: not only do people base their moral values, judgments, and 
arguments on different configurations of the five foundations depending on whether 
someone is an ingroup member or an outgroup member, they also have different 
configurations of moral foundations depending on the type of outgroup someone is a 
member of.  
 While the present study provides initial evidence for the effect of group 
membership on the use of moral foundations, it nevertheless has a number of limitations. 
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First, participants were individuals who only imagined other groups when making their 
ratings of target groups. Given the results indicated various stereotypic expectations 
might be driving the utilization of moral foundations, it may be the case that when 
actually interacting with another group, different moral foundations may be implemented 
to differing degrees. This may especially be the case when interacting with groups whose 
membership may not particularly salient (e.g., housewives, welfare recipients, business 
professionals). Future research might utilize a minimal group paradigm to address this 
issue. 
 Second, the MMM proposes an approach-avoidance component of moral 
foundations. In order to provide initial evidence for moral foundations at the group level, 
the present study took a more straightforward approach and did not investigate how 
motivation may influence the relationship between group membership and moral 
foundation configuration. Although moral foundations theory incorporates both 
proscriptive and prescriptive (c.f., approach and avoidance) components into their 
foundations, it may be the case that approach-avoidance motivations influence the use of 
moral foundations in certain contexts. Given the current results, future research should 
attempt to examine how differing forms of motivation might moderate the relationships 
between group membership and moral foundations.  
 Third, the critiques of the MMM raise a concern about the locus of moral concern 
versus the target of moral judgment. The MMM does not explicitly consider how each of 
these may influence one’s utilization of moral foundations. Keeping in line with the 
literature on moral foundation theory, the present study examined group-level moral 
foundations as targets of moral judgment. That is, the current research framed the targets 
 31 
of moral judgment as particular groups (i.e., ingroups and outgroups). However, it may 
be the case that individuals also used a locus of moral concern to derive their judgments. 
For example, when individuals were asked to consider LwHc outgroups, they judged 
these groups to be less concerned with harm and fairness concerns in the present study. 
The target of their moral judgment was the LwHc outgroup (i.e., the rich or business 
professionals) but their locus of moral concern may have been their own ingroup (i.e., 
group-protect). Moreover, Graham (2013) suggested moral foundation use might differ if 
judgments are based on the locus of moral concern or targets of moral judgment. Thus, 
future research should attempt to tease apart these concerns. 
 Lastly, the present study relied on self-report ratings. Although political identity 
was measured and controlled for, an investigation of whether or not differences in moral 
foundations at the group level exist implicitly as well as explicitly was not conducted. 
Haidt’s (2001) social-intuitionist model, as well as recent studies of moral issues (Greene, 
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009), 
indicates moral judgment heavily relies on automatic processes. Future research using 
implicit measurement method will be essential for understanding the ways in which 
various groups make moral judgments. 
 As globalization continues to unfold, societies are becoming more diverse. With 
such diversity come differing notions about how to regulate selfishness and how we 
ought to live together. Many of the ideas on how best to solve these issues are rooted in 
moral convictions. Moral foundations theory offers a useful way to conceptualize and 
measure such convictions. As research on moral psychology advances, perhaps it will 
clarify the role that morality plays in group thought and behavior. 
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 N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. 
Mean 
t Sig. 
Harm score* 
   MFQ1 
   Intragroup 
 
11 
24 
 
3.09 
3.67 
 
.90 
.57 
 
.27 
.12 
-2.32 .021 
Fairness score 
   MFQ1 
   Intragroup 
 
11 
24 
 
3.08 
3.28 
 
.62 
.67 
 
.19 
.14 
-.83 .411 
Ingroup score 
   MFQ1 
   Intragroup 
 
11 
24 
 
2.88 
2.83 
 
.96 
.71 
 
.29 
.15 
.18 .861 
Authority score 
   MFQ1 
   Intragroup 
 
11 
24 
 
3.17 
2.72 
 
.75 
.79 
 
.23 
.16 
1.60 .120 
Purity score 
   MFQ1 
   Intragroup 
 
11 
24 
 
2.33 
2.22 
 
1.08 
.91 
 
.33 
.19 
.34 .739 
 
Table 1. Intragroup conditions (one multiple group (MFQ1) and intragroup) 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. 
Mean 
t Sig. 
Harm score 
   MFQ2 
   Intragroup 
 
5 
24 
 
3.13 
3.67 
 
.93 
.57 
 
.42 
.12 
-1.72 .097 
Fairness score 
   MFQ2 
   Intragroup 
 
5 
24 
 
3.00 
3.28 
 
1.03 
.67 
 
.46 
.14 
-.76 .453 
Ingroup score 
   MFQ2 
   Intragroup 
 
5 
24 
 
2.80 
2.83 
 
.49 
.71 
 
.22 
.15 
-.08 .935 
Authority score 
   MFQ2 
   Intragroup 
 
5 
24 
 
2.87 
2.72 
 
.59 
.79 
 
.27 
.16 
.40 .689 
Purity score 
   MFQ2 
   Intragroup 
 
5 
24 
 
2.30 
2.22 
 
.94 
.91 
 
.42 
.19 
.19 .852 
 
Table 2. Intragroup conditions (one multiple group (MFQ2) and single intragroup) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. 
Mean 
t Sig. 
Harm score* 
   MFQ1 
   The rich 
 
11 
13 
 
2.56 
3.49 
 
.76 
.77 
 
.23 
.21 
-2.90 .008 
Fairness score 
   MFQ1 
   The rich 
 
11 
13 
 
2.67 
2.87 
 
.39 
.91 
 
.12 
.25 
-.69 .495 
Ingroup score* 
   MFQ1 
   The rich 
 
11 
13 
 
2.42 
2.95 
 
.50 
.66 
 
.15 
.18 
-2.16 .042 
Authority score 
   MFQ1 
   The rich 
 
11 
13 
 
2.77 
3.09 
 
.63 
.66 
 
.19 
.18 
-1.20 .245 
Purity score 
   MFQ1 
   The rich 
 
11 
13 
 
2.56 
2.69 
 
.90 
.52 
 
.27 
.14 
-.46 .652 
 
Table 3. The rich conditions (MFQ1 and single rich) 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. 
Mean 
t Sig. 
Harm score 
   MFQ2 
   Bus. Prof. 
 
5 
6 
 
3.17 
3.61 
 
.31 
.97 
 
.14 
.40 
-.98 .355 
Fairness score 
   MFQ2 
   Bus. Prof. 
 
5 
6 
 
3.63 
2.78 
 
.46 
.95 
 
.21 
.39 
1.84 .100 
Ingroup score 
   MFQ2 
   Bus. Prof. 
 
5 
6 
 
3.00 
3.08 
 
.85 
.76 
 
.38 
.31 
-.17 .867 
Authority score 
   MFQ2 
   Bus. Prof. 
 
5 
6 
 
2.90 
3.00 
 
.64 
.86 
 
.29 
.35 
-.21 .835 
Purity score 
   MFQ2 
   Bus. Prof. 
 
5 
6 
 
2.63 
2.39 
 
.74 
.87 
 
.33 
.36 
.49 .633 
 
Table 4. Business professionals conditions (MFQ2 and single business professionals) 
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 N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. 
Mean 
t Sig. 
Harm score 
   MFQ1 
   Housewives 
 
11 
6 
 
3.24 
3.11 
 
.85 
.87 
 
.26 
.36 
.30 .768 
Fairness score 
   MFQ1 
   Housewives 
 
11 
6 
 
3.00 
3.14 
 
.87 
.85 
 
.26 
.35 
-.32 .755 
Ingroup score 
   MFQ1 
   Housewives 
 
11 
6 
 
2.65 
2.56 
 
.65 
.29 
 
.20 
.12 
.32 .754 
Authority score 
   MFQ1 
   Housewives 
 
11 
6 
 
2.91 
2.93 
 
.88 
.57 
 
.26 
.23 
-.05 .958 
Purity score 
   MFQ1 
   Housewives 
 
11 
6 
 
2.34 
2.42 
 
1.10 
.83 
 
.33 
.34 
-.14 .888 
 
Table 5. Housewives conditions (MFQ1 and single housewives) 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. 
Mean 
t Sig. 
Harm score 
   MFQ2 
   The elderly 
 
5 
10 
 
3.73 
3.09 
 
.38 
.95 
 
.17 
.30 
1.43 .175 
Fairness score 
   MFQ2 
   The elderly 
 
5 
10 
 
3.63 
2.98 
 
.46 
.69 
 
.21 
.22 
1.88 .083 
Ingroup score 
   MFQ2 
   The elderly 
 
5 
10 
 
2.67 
2.95 
 
.77 
.53 
 
.35 
.17 
-.84 .414 
Authority score 
   MFQ2 
   The elderly 
 
5 
10 
 
3.10 
2.77 
 
.48 
.50 
 
.21 
.16 
1.24 .239 
Purity score 
   MFQ2 
   The elderly 
 
5 
10 
 
3.00 
2.33 
 
.72 
.75 
 
.32 
.24 
1.64 .125 
 
Table 6. The elderly conditions (MFQ2 and single elderly) 
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 N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. 
Mean 
t Sig. 
Harm score 
   MFQ1 
   The homeless 
 
11 
15 
 
3.32 
3.66 
 
.79 
.78 
 
.24 
.20 
-1.08 .289 
Fairness score 
   MFQ1 
   The homeless 
 
11 
15 
 
3.60 
3.47 
 
.91 
.90 
 
.29 
.23 
.36 .722 
Ingroup score 
   MFQ1 
   The homeless 
 
11 
15 
 
2.70 
2.55 
 
.68 
.75 
 
.22 
.19 
.50 .625 
Authority score 
   MFQ1 
   The homeless 
 
11 
15 
 
2.69 
2.76 
 
.66 
.78 
 
.21 
.20 
-.22 .825 
Purity score 
   MFQ1 
   The homeless 
 
11 
15 
 
2.48 
2.72 
 
1.08 
.91 
 
.34 
.24 
-.58 .565 
 
Table 7. The homeless conditions (MFQ1 and single homeless) 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. 
Mean 
t Sig. 
Harm score 
   MFQ2 
   Welfare recipients 
 
5 
13 
 
3.43 
3.31 
 
.57 
.84 
 
.26 
.23 
.31 .760 
Fairness score 
   MFQ2 
   Welfare recipients 
 
5 
13 
 
3.50 
3.17 
 
.61 
.73 
 
.27 
.20 
.90 .380 
Ingroup score 
   MFQ2 
   Welfare recipients 
 
5 
13 
 
2.40 
2.45 
 
1.09 
.63 
 
.49 
.17 
-.12 .906 
Authority score 
   MFQ2 
   Welfare recipients 
 
5 
13 
 
3.13 
2.86 
 
.46 
.72 
 
.21 
.20 
.78 .444 
Purity score 
   MFQ2 
   Welfare recipients 
 
5 
 13 
 
2.57 
2.46 
 
1.08 
1.12 
 
.48 
.31 
.18 .860 
 
Table 8. Welfare recipients conditions (MFQ2 and single welfare recipients) 
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 Initial n Initial 
proportion to n 
After data 
exclusion n 
After data 
exclusion 
proportion to n 
Age 
 
-- 18.9% (SD 
1.13) 
-- 18.9% (SD 
1.27) 
Male 
 
88 21.5% 31 25.6% 
Female 
 
299 72.9% 88 72.7% 
Caucasian 
 
217 52.9% 60 50% 
Asian 
 
73 17.8% 25 20.7% 
Hispanic 
 
61 14.9% 24 19.8% 
Black 
 
15 .04% 5 .04% 
Middle Eastern 
 
11 .03% 4 .03% 
 
Table 9. Proportion of sample change after exclusionary data method 
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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUTGROUP SETS 
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Independent Var. Dependent Variable F Sig. 
Outgroup Set HwHc Harm* 4.846 .030 
HwHc Fairness 3.240 .074 
HwHc Loyalty .298 .586 
HwHc Authority 1.268 .262 
HwHc Purity .063 .802 
LwHc Harm 1.843 .177 
LwHc Fairness* 9.313 .003 
LwHc Loyalty 2.029 .157 
LwHc Authority .031 .861 
LwHc Purity .544 .462 
HwLc Harm* 6.873 .010 
HwLc Fairness* 12.267 .001 
HwLc Loyalty 3.214 .076 
HwLc Authority .081 .777 
HwLc Purity .663 .417 
LwLc Harm 1.689 .196 
LwLc Fairness 2.311 .131 
LwLc Loyalty 3.677 .058 
LwLc Authority 3.772 .055 
LwLc Purity .320 .573 
 
Table 10. Hotelling’s T2 results for outgroup sets on MFS 
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